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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores the periodicity of planned depot maintenance and its effects 
on failure rates for U.S. Coast Guard shipboard davit systems. Davits are used on Coast 
Guard cutters to launch small boats, which are needed to accomplish a range of missions. 
The operational availability of these davit systems is important in keeping Coast Guard 
cutters fully mission capable. This study collected davit failure and maintenance data 
from nearly eight years of archived records for two cutter classes, which served as a 
sample of Welin Lambie davit systems that are widely used in the fleet. Concepts of 
reliability, availability, and maintainability were applied to calculate failure rates, mean 
time between maintenance, and mean time between failures. From this information, 
statistical hypothesis testing was used to determine what factors influence the system 
failure rate. It also addresses whether the historical data on these systems can be used to 
develop experimental models and whether those models can be used to influence 
decisions on maintenance periodicity. 
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 The U.S. Coast Guard’s cutter fleet has a broad array of missions including search 
and rescue, environmental protection, aids to navigation, homeland security, and drug 
interdiction. Most cutters conduct their operations with the use of small boats that are 
deployed using shipboard davit or crane systems. These boat launch systems are vitally 
important to maintaining mission readiness, yet they consist of many integrated 
mechanical, hydraulic, electrical, and electronic components that have a potential for 
failure. The Welin Lambie model TW.PIV 5.0B dual-point davit is one such system that is 
used on numerous classes of cutter. The Coast Guard collects maintenance and failure 
records for these systems, which make it possible to conduct analyses that may help inform 
maintenance programs. 
The Coast Guard’s Surface Forces Logistics Center (SFLC) provides technical, 
logistics, and maintenance support to the cutter and small boat fleet. SFLC is comprised of 
seven Shared Services Divisions and five Product Lines, which generate the policy and 
procedures for maintenance and repair management. The SFLC dictates a bi-level 
maintenance program; organizational-level maintenance is the responsibility of the cutter 
crews whereas depot-level maintenance is supported by a platform’s respective Product 
Line. The Welin Lambie davits onboard the Reliance Class (WMEC-210) and Famous 
Class (WMEC-270) cutters have planned depot maintenance that consists of overhauls and 
renewals. Davit overhauls occur after four years of operation, with a renewal occurring 
after the following four years. This periodicity is based on many considerations including 
manufacturer recommendations, funding levels, and historic conditional needs. An analysis 
into the relationship between depot maintenance periodicity and the failure rates may 
provide additional quantifiable guidance on improving overhaul and renewal schedules. 
 This study began by collecting davit discrepancy reports and planned depot 
maintenance records from January 1, 2011, to December 14, 2018. A series of assumptions 
and definitions were applied to the data to extrapolate only the discrepancies that directly 
impacted the operational availability of each davit. As davits were renewed instead of 
overhauled, they were treated as a separate davit from the one they replaced, which 
xvi 
generated 45 individual units. Then the duration between scheduled maintenance actions 
and number of failures within those periods were used to calculate the mean time between 
maintenance (MTBM) and mean time between failure (MTBF) associated with each davit. 
Statistical methods were used to conduct hypothesis testing and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) testing, which examined what factors had influence on the failure rates. Finally, 
a model was created in ExtendSim that would simulate davit maintenance life cycles and 
permit exploration of influential factors. 
 The statistical analysis first revealed that maintenance periods containing left or 
right censored data were statistically different than maintenance periods containing 
uncensored data. The censored data was removed, leaving 18 complete davit maintenance 
periods for the follow-on factor assessments. A comparison between overhauled davits to 
renewed davits revealed no clear impact that the type of depot maintenance had on the 
subsequent MTBF. The maintenance period durations were also broken into four groups 
of 500 days each, ranging from 0 to 2000 days. An ANOVA was used to compare the 
impacts the MTBM had on the failure rates, which also produced no significant difference. 
Next, ANOVAs were used to determine the impact that each cutter’s geographic region of 
homeport had on the davit MTBM and on MTBF. Again, the analysis revealed no influence 
that this factor had on either variable. Finally, experimentation with the ExtendSim model 
revealed that maintaining a desired level of MTBF would theoretically be more influential 
on davit availability than changing the depot maintenance periodicity. 
 The statistical analysis resulted in identifying no clear influence that the various 
factors had on the davit failure rates. The absence of a trend between the scheduled MTBM 
and the MTBF indicated that the davit failures were mostly random and did not follow a 
wear-out distribution. The results of the modeling and simulation indicated that other 
methods of controlling MTBF beside planned maintenance periodicity should be explored. 
The Coast Guard may improve the ability to perform future analyses by tracking davit 
operating hours, similar to the way main diesel engines and generators are tracked. The 
results of this analysis, if accurate, may also indicate that the periodicity between costly 
depot maintenance actions could be extended without necessarily reducing the operational 
availability of the davit systems. 
xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to thank my wife, Kate, and my children, Bridget, Ellie, and 
Abigail, for being supportive, loving, and patient throughout my Coast Guard career and 
my graduate education. You have sacrificed so much, including our time apart from each 
other, and this thesis development has been no exception. I would also like to thank my 
parents for all the love and encouragement throughout my life to keep learning and 
expanding my education. 
I would also like to thank my thesis advisory team, Dr. Alejandro Hernandez, 
Dr. Bryan O’Halloran, and Dr. Paul Beery, who provided endless guidance throughout 
this process. Professor Hernandez, thank you for your time keeping me focused and 
progressing through the data collection and analysis. Professors O’Halloran and Beery, 
thank you for the in-depth discussions and guidance on reliability and modeling methods. 
Finally, thanks to all the NPS faculty I have worked with over the past two years for 
providing me with the tools and knowledge to conduct this study. 
xviii 





The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of maintenance periodicity on 
the operational availability of Coast Guard cutter systems. The results of the study are 
intended to inform policy for intervals between scheduled depot maintenance. It will also 
demonstrate the ability to use modeling and simulation (M&S) to establish maintenance 
and repair intervals for shipboard equipment. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Military ships such as Coast Guard cutters operate in a wide variety of unforgiving 
environments. Exterior equipment onboard these vessels are often exposed to extreme 
temperatures, corrosive seawater, salt air, sun radiation, rain and ice, and physical 
vibrations. These environmental factors cause wear on machinery over time even when the 
equipment is not in use. Protective coatings break down, metal corrodes, electrical 
connections fail, and gaskets crack. 
In addition to the environmental effects, dynamic systems are also subjected to a 
wide range of wear and stresses throughout their operation. Mechanical contact surfaces 
become worn, seals break, fluids leak, and electronics fail. Left unchecked, these 
conditions gradually increase the probability of total system failure. 
These issues necessitate rigorous maintenance programs that are designed to keep 
all equipment operating as intended. Preserving the availability of equipment is essential 
to ensuring ship operations can be carried out unhindered. Equipment maintenance 
includes routine inspections, measurements, repairs, overhauls, and even renewals as 
needed. This typically requires a great deal of continuous attention from vessel crew 
members and depot maintenance organizations. 
Most U.S. Coast Guard cutters, service vessels at least 65 feet in length, utilize davit 
or crane systems to store and launch their small boats. This thesis will examine the Welin 
Lambie davits onboard the 270-foot Famous class (WMEC-270) and 210-foot Reliance 
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class (WMEC-210) cutters as a case study for ship equipment maintenance. There are 13 
Famous class cutters and 14 Reliance class cutters in active service, which are classified as 
Medium Endurance Cutters (MECs). These cutters are used to execute many of the Coast 
Guard’s broad missions that include maritime safety, law enforcement, and homeland 
security. The first Famous class cutter, CGC BEAR, was placed in service in 1983 while 
the first Reliance class cutter, CGC RELIANCE, entered service in 1964 (US Coast Guard 
n.d.). 
The MECs each have two small boats with dedicated launch systems. Each MEC 
has a port-side crane that launches a small boat using a single-point hoisting cable. The 
other launch system is the starboard-side Welin Lambie model TW.PIV 5.0B dual-point 
davit system, which launches an over-the-horizon cutter boat (CB-OTH). 
  
Figure 1. Welin Lambie Dual-Point Davit on a 270-foot MEC, Shown with 
Cutter Boat Cradled. Source: Welin Lambie (n.d.). 
While all launch systems are operationally important, the CB-OTH is the cutter’s 
primary response boat for many missions including counter-narcotics and migrant 
interdictions, rescue-and-assistance, safety inspection boardings, helicopter operations, 
and man overboard emergencies. The ability of a cutter to utilize its small boats depends 
not only on the boat conditions but also the operational availability of the respective 
launching system. Therefore, the Welin Lambie dual-point davit systems onboard the 
cutters are vital to maintaining the mission capabilities of each ship.  
Unfortunately, these davit systems can be prone to failure. In 2018, Cutter 
Engineering Reports submitted from the 270-foot MEC commands listed the Welin Lambie 
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davit failures and maintenance difficulties as one of their top engineering concerns (Keane 
2019). Although the reliability of the davit systems overall is generally high, the 
consequences of a davit that is no longer fully operational can be significant. Any casualty 
that hinders the ability to quickly and safely launch the CB-OTH will degrade a cutter’s 
ability to carry out most of its operational missions. 
 The davits are maintained by the cutter crews and depot-level resources. The Welin 
Lambie davits are part of a rotating pool program in which each cutter’s davit is replaced 
with a fully refurbished one approximately every eight years, with a depot-level in-place 
overhaul performed four years after each renewal. This program is costly but is intended 
to keep the davits in a state that is maintainable by the ship crew. It is also intended to reset 
the clock on the davit life cycle every eight years to prevent cascading component failures 
due to excessive age, corrosion, and wear. There is a good deal of interest in whether that 
time-based work is warranted. 
 The Coast Guard maintenance program currently tracks certain failure data as well 
as the maintenance activities that are performed on the equipment. In theory, this 
information can be analyzed to determine the failure rates of these davit systems. A systems 
engineering (SE) approach can be implemented to analyze historic failure data, model the 
system life cycle, and predict failure probabilities to determine when the major 
maintenance overhauls should be conducted. 
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The Coast Guard must continue to seek ways to improve its maintenance 
management to minimize the frequency of equipment failures that impact mission 
readiness. The objective of this study is to use the Welin Lambie davit system onboard the 
270-foot and 210-foot MECs to model failure patterns and identify ways to adjust the depot 
maintenance schedule that will improve davit availability. To achieve this objective, this 
thesis will answer the following research questions: 
1) How can the failure and maintenance data that the Coast Guard currently 
collects be used to generate system failure models? 
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2) How can the frequency of depot-level overhauls and renewals be modified 
to improve the operational availability of the MEC davits? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study can directly benefit the Coast Guard’s maintenance of the davit systems 
onboard the EMC fleet. Other cutter classes that have similar Welin Lambie davits such as 
the 225-foot Seagoing Buoy Tenders can also benefit from the findings of this study. 
Additionally, the methodology can potentially be extended to analyze periodic 
maintenance on many other types of engineering equipment throughout the Coast Guard 
and Department of Defense (DOD) platforms. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter II provides the context of this topic 
by detailing the literature review of Coast Guard’s maintenance policies, commercial davit 
maintenance practices, and previous availability modeling techniques. Chapter III 
discusses the approach used to collect and interpret the data as well as the methodology 
applied in analyzing data and developing a model. Chapter IV provides the results of the 
analysis that was performed, and Chapter V provides the conclusions and 
recommendations based on those findings.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The topics of maintenance and reliability are heavily studied within industry and 
the military. However, there seem to be limited published studies that apply specifically to 
shipboard davit systems. Therefore, the literature review explores how maintenance is 
managed for critical systems onboard Coast Guard cutters in order to maintain the 
availability of the system. 
B. U.S. COAST GUARD MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 
Ship maintenance in the United States Coast Guard is managed within the Deputy 
Commandant for Mission Support (DCMS), which commands the Assistant Commandant 
for Engineering and Logistics (CG-4). This directorate consists of six program offices 
including the Office of Aeronautical Engineering (CG-41), Office of Civil Engineering 
(CG-43), Office of Logistics (CG-44), Office of Naval Engineering (CG-45), Office of 
Energy Management (CG-46), and the Office of Environmental Management (CG-47). 
The Office of Naval Engineering commands the Surface Forces Logistics Center (SFLC), 
which manages the maintenance, repair, logistics, and technical information of the Coast 
Guard’s surface vessel fleet. 
The SFLC is comprised of five product lines, each of which manages engineering 
and logistics support for several classes of cutters or small boats regardless of geographic 
location of the assets. These are the Small Boat Product Line, Patrol Boat Product Line, 
Medium Endurance Cutter Product Line, Long Range Enforcer Product Line, and 
Icebreaker, Buoy, and Construction Tender Product Line. Each product line is responsible 
for providing constant mission support to their respective assets and are the primary conduit 
between naval engineering staff and the fleet Commanding Officers (DCMS n.d.). 
The SFLC also consists of seven Shared Service Divisions, which provide support 
to all product lines for “engineering, supply, contracting, industrial services, and logistics 
management” (DCMS n.d.). These shared divisions consist of the subject matter experts 
that establish the technical engineering processes used by all product lines. One of these 
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divisions is the Engineering Services Division (ESD), which “provides engineering 
services, technical publications, engineering technical authority, maintenance procedure 
card (MPC) development…, and reliability centered maintenance (RCM) support services” 
(DCMS n.d.). Each product line works with the ESD to establish the maintenance 
definitions and schedules for all equipment onboard its respective platforms. 
 
Figure 2. SFLC Organizational Chart 
This study will focus on a shipboard davit system that is installed on several classes 
of cutter; however, the analysis will be performed specifically on the davits installed on 
the WMEC 270-foot and the WMEC 210-foot Medium Endurance Cutters. Maintenance 
of these ships falls under the purview of the Medium Endurance Cutter Product Line 
(MECPL), which works closely with each cutter command to ensure the vessels are 
properly maintained and repaired to meet operational requirements. The MECPL is divided 
into three branches, the Engineering Branch, the Program Depot Maintenance (PDM) 
Branch, and the Supply Branch. The Engineering Branch is the asset manager and subject 
matter expert for the equipment on the MECs, and it regulates the periodicity of 
maintenance. It also works closely with cutter Engineer Officers (EO) to ensure 
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maintenance and repairs are properly monitored and recorded. The PDM Branch schedules, 
plans, and executes contracts for depot-level maintenance and repairs including all major 
dockside and dry dock availabilities. 
C. U.S. COAST GUARD MAINTENANCE POLICY 
The Coast Guard’s Mission Support Business Model establishes the requirement 
for a bi-level maintenance program that is divided into organizational-level (O-Level) and 
depot-level (D-Level) services. Generally, the completion of O-Level maintenance is the 
responsibility of the individual cutter crews, while the scheduling and execution of D-Level 
maintenance is the responsibility of the respective product line in conjunction with the 
crews. Both levels of maintenance consist of planned and corrective actions. 
Planned or preventative maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis in order to 
maintain the operation of equipment and prevent unexpected failures. Operational units 
complete planned O-Level maintenance through the Planned Maintenance System (PMS), 
which defines the periodicity and scope of all planned maintenance actions that need to be 
completed by the crews. Each maintenance action is described in step-by-step detail in 
Maintenance Procedure Cards (MPCs). The periodicity of maintenance has a broad range 
of frequency from daily to annual actions, including condition-based and operational hour-
based actions. The cutter crews record all completed planned maintenance within a 
computer program called the Mobile Asset Manager (MAM), which feeds information to 
a maintenance database called the Fleet Logistics System (FLS). Planned D-Level 
maintenance is scheduled by the responsible product line and typically involves extensive 
inspections and overhauls performed by a contractor during maintenance availabilities. 
When D-level maintenance is completed, the responsible Product Line records the 
information in FLS. 
Corrective, or unplanned, maintenance is performed as necessary in response to 
equipment failures or unanticipated repairs. Unplanned O-Level maintenance frequently 
occurs when equipment fails or any time a ship crew identifies a discrepancy while 
monitoring equipment operation or while conducting planned maintenance. At the unit 
level, the unplanned maintenance typically involves troubleshooting, parts replacements, 
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and limited-resource repairs. As the crew completes corrective maintenance actions, those 
actions are supposed to be recorded in the MAM tracking system (SFLC 2019).  
If an equipment failure is severe enough to require resources beyond the crews’ 
capabilities, the D-Level corrective maintenance will be supported by the SFLC Product 
Line using either Coast Guard support personnel or contracted services. If the failure does 
not impact cutter operations but requires non-urgent D-Level assistance, then the cutter 
crew enters a Non-Casualty Work Request (NCWR) in MAM (SFLC 2019). However, if 
the casualty has an impact on operations and/or requires urgent assistance from the Product 
Line, then the cutter creates a maintenance record in the Electronic Asset Logbook (EAL) 
(SFLC 2019). These unplanned maintenance records are called discrepancies (discreps), 
which replaced the Coast Guard’s use of the Navy’s casualty reports (CASREPs) system. 
The EAL tool is an electronic system that communicates discrep statuses to the Product 
Line and provides operational status visibility for Coast Guard assets (SFLC 2019). 
D. MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS FOR MEC DAVIT SYSTEMS 
The Welin Lambie davits have a broad array of O-Level inspections and repairs 
that follow the Coast Guard’s maintenance policies. These actions are intended to routinely 
identify and prevent davit problems before a system failure occurs. This maintenance by 
the cutter crews cannot resolve all issues, especially certain age-related failures that do not 
present clear physical indicators. Therefore, the Coast Guard has adopted a time-based D-
Level maintenance model for the davit systems. This includes scheduled in-place overhauls 
and renewals of the davit systems for each cutter. Each event is intended to reset the 
reliability and life cycle of each davit, though the full renewal addresses more corrosion 
and cosmetic issues than the overhaul does. 
The schedules for davit depot overhauls and renewals have evolved over time; 
however, the current standard is an in-place overhaul every four years and a full 
replacement every eight years. The MEC Product Line also has contracts in place for Welin 
Lambie technical representative (tech rep) assistance, which is used to assist the crews in 
correcting davit casualties as they occur. These costly programs are driven by many factors 
including the reliability of the davit systems, the effectiveness of the periodic maintenance, 
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the time needed to renovate davits and obtain parts, and the money that can be allocated to 
the davit systems. 
The four-year overhaul is conducted by a contractor whose work is overseen by a 
certified Welin Lambie tech rep. The project is considered a depot-level inspection, testing, 
and overhaul which extends the life of the davit another four years until it is renewed again. 
All major components are cleaned and inspected including structural members, mechanical 
components, hydraulic reservoirs and valves, electrical cables and wiring, winches, and all 
foundation welds (Mikedis 2015). The work specification also requires the contractor to 
overhaul and lubricate all weight lifting mechanical components, replacing any wearing 
components as needed. The contractor then repaints, tests, and certifies the davit system 
which places it back in operational service. 
The eight-year davit renewal consists of maintaining a rotatable pool of davits. This 
time-based renewal process allows the MEC Product Line to effectively budget funds and 
manage the depot projects around cutter operational schedules. The Product Line works 
with Welin Lambie to maintain a few spare davits that supplement the rotating pool (Welin 
Lambie 2016). When a cutter is scheduled for renewal, its davit is removed and a 
replacement is installed by a commercial contractor under the supervision of a certified 
Welin Lambie tech rep. The removed davit is sent to Welin Lambie’s facilities for a full 
OEM refurbishment, after which it is placed back into the pool as an available spare. 
E. PRINCIPLES OF RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, AND 
MAINTAINABILITY 
This study relies heavily on the concepts of reliability, availability, and 
maintainability (RAM). These concepts help build the groundwork for the primary focus, 
which is the operational availability of the Welin Lambie davit systems. In order to 
determine the operational availability, there must be an understanding of how reliable the 
systems are throughout their life cycle. Likewise, the system maintainability must be well 
understood in order to assess the impacts that maintenance has on availability. 
Reliability is the probability that a system will perform its intended function for a 
given period of time in a given operating environment (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 
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410). For a system such as the davit, it is important to have good reliability especially 
considering the impact the equipment status can have on the cutter’s capabilities. 
Reliability is an “inherent characteristic of design,” therefore it should theoretically be the 
same from one davit to the next assuming each davit is configured the same and is operated 
in the same environments (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 412). However, since the 
expected design reliability is not known for the Welin Lambie davits, it must be calculated 
from existing archival data. 
A key measure of reliability is the reliability function or survival function. 
Blanchard and Fabrycky define this as the “probability that a system (or product) will be 
successful for at least some specified time t,” which is given by the formula: 
 ( ) ( )1R t F t= −  (1.1) 
The function F(t) is the failure distribution function, or the probability that a system will 
fail by a given amount of time. The way this function is calculated depends on the failure 
characteristics of a piece of equipment, namely the type of probability distribution that the 
failures generally follow. Common failure distributions are exponential, normal, Poisson, 
and Weibull, though the distribution would be derived from a system’s specific failure 
profile (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 413). 
If using archival failure data, an effective way to determine the reliability and 
availability of a system is to calculate its failure rate λ and the mean time between failures 
(MTBF). Meantime between failure is the average time that occurs between consecutive 
failures in a system. Figure 3 displays a generic system operating cycle that includes 
operating (up) times and non-operational maintenance (down) times. The MTBF would be 
the mean of all up times tn. The MTBF can be used as a measure of reliability, but it must 





Figure 3. Diagram of a System Operating Cycle. Source: MTL Instruments 
(2010). 
Failure rate is the number of failures that occur over a given interval of time. For 





λ =   (1.2) 
The failure rate can be related to the MTBF for a given period of evaluation. If the failure 
rate does not change over time, indicating an exponential failure distribution, then MTBF 
can be expressed as the inverse of the failure rate (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 414): 
 1MTBF
λ
=  (1.3) 
Since reliability is a function of time, its value is dependent on the time scale being 
analyzed. The time scale can vary depending on the intended purpose of the analysis and 
the type of data available. Meeker and Escobar (1998) use the example of automobile 
components stating that some can be assessed based on the miles driven while others may 
be more appropriately assessed by calendar age. A component whose failure mode is 
largely a result of use-rate would be relevant for a time scale using hours of operation. 
Conversely, a component whose failure mode is impacted by its time in service regardless 
of usage would be suited for a calendar age time scale. These concepts, along with the type 
of data available, will be applied when considering the form of reliability analysis 
performed for the Coast Guard davits. 
Another important concept of RAM is a system’s maintainability, which is the 
“ability of a system to be maintained” (INCOSE 2015, 228). Maintenance is simply the 
actions that are performed on a system to keep it operating or to return it to operation. The 
Coast Guard’s approach to preventative and corrective maintenance has previously been 
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discussed, and those actions vary based on each system’s maintainability. This is because 
maintainability is an intrinsic property of a given system’s design (INCOSE 2015, 228). 
Maintainability is often represented in terms of maintenance times or maintenance 
frequency. Both are dependent on factors of a system’s uptime and downtime. The 
downtime consists of active corrective and preventative maintenance, administrative delay 
time, and logistics delay time (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 478). The active maintenance 
time can be expressed as mean active maintenance time ( M ), which is the average time 
needed for corrective and preventative actions (2014, 487). However, the full downtime 
including administrative and logistics delays is typically expressed simply as maintenance 
downtime (MDT). Like the active maintenance time, this is usually expressed as an average 
of all associated time requirements (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 488). Figure 4 
illustrates the time domain of a system and shows the breakdown of uptime and downtime 
factors. 
 
Figure 4. System Uptime and Downtime Factors. Adapted from Blanchard 
and Fabrycky (2014). 
Maintenance frequency is commonly expressed as the mean time between 
maintenance (MTBM), which includes both preventative and corrective actions (Blanchard 









where MTBMU is the mean time between unscheduled maintenance and MTBMS is the 
mean time between scheduled maintenance (2014, 490). Since MTBMU consists of 
unscheduled downtimes, typically due to failures, it can be used as an approximation of 
MTBF. The reciprocal of MTBMU can also be used as an approximation for the failure 
rate. Likewise, the reciprocal of MTBMS can be considered the rate at which planned 
maintenance is conducted. 
While reliability is a probability that a system will perform as intended, availability 
is the percentage of time that a system is available for use under specified circumstances. 
In relation to the other concepts of RAM, a system’s availability is dependent on its 
reliability and maintainability (INCOSE 2015, 228). There are three primary availability 
definitions: inherent availability (Ai), achieved availability (Aa), and operational 
availability (Ao). These definitions vary by the environment in which the system is 
operating as well as the type of support that is being considered. 
Blanchard and Fabrycky define inherent availability as “the probability that a 
system or equipment, when used under stated conditions in an ideal support environment 
(i.e., readily available tools, spares, maintenance personnel, etc.), will operate satisfactorily 
at any point in time as required” (2014, 492). They define achieved availability as “the 
probability that a system or equipment, when used under stated conditions in an ideal 
support environment, will operate satisfactorily at any point in time” (2014, 493). The 
difference between these two definitions is that Ai does not factor in time for preventive 
maintenance, logistics delays, and administrative delays, whereas Aa only excludes time 
for logistics and administrative delays (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 493). An important 
note for these availability metrics is that they consider the system in an ideal support 
environment and not a realistic operating environment.  
Operational availability is defined as the “probability that a system or equipment, 
when used under stated conditions in an actual operational environment, will operate 
satisfactorily when called upon” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2014, 493). Therefore, Ao 
includes time needed for all maintenance actions, planned and unplanned, as well as time 
needed for logistics and administrative delays. Blanchard and Fabrycky express 








where MTBM is the mean time between maintenance and MDT is the mean down time. 
Because MTBM includes planned and unplanned maintenance, this time can be considered 
the system’s uptime. Likewise, the MDT can be considered the system’s downtime. 
Therefore, Ao can be treated as the ratio of system uptime to the entire time scale of uptime 
plus downtime. 
F. RELATED RESEARCH 
While there appear to be few published analyses on shipboard davits, there have 
been applicable studies performed on other critical Coast Guard cutter systems such as the 
main diesel engines. In 2004, Milkie and Perakis published the technical paper Statistical 
Methods for Planning Diesel Engine Overhauls in the U. S. Coast Guard. This paper uses 
casualty report data to help model the failure rates vs operating hour for the diesel engines 
on Coast Guard Reliance class cutters. A similar approach could be applied to study the 
failure rates over time for the dual point davit system. 
The intent of the Milkie and Perakis study is comparable to the intent of this thesis, 
which is to use historical failure data to help better inform when depot-level preventative 
maintenance should be conducted on a system. Their study examined failure rates as they 
pertained to hours of engine operating time, which each cutter records. This estimated the 
extent of system operation that would typically result in an expected number of casualties. 
It was not concerned with the cause of each engine failure, only that each failure had an 
operational impact (Milkie and Perakis 2004, 31). The data collected by Milkie and Perakis 
indicated an area of constant failure rate with an increasing rate of failure as the engines 
neared 24,000 hours of operation. The analysis ultimately found that the engine life cycles 
experienced failure rates that increased as operating hours increased (Milkie and Perakis 
2004, 39). It also indicated that scheduled engine overhauls based on engine hours did not 
prevent an increase in wear-out failure rates. This ultimately resulted in a recommendation 
for the Coast Guard to pursue more condition monitoring and reliability-centered 
maintenance approach to the diesel engine overhaul policy (Milkie and Perakis 2004, 39). 
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Based on background information regarding shipboard davits, some initial 
comparisons can be made between this diesel engine study and a study for the davits. 
Milkie and Perakis were able to use the engine hours of operation since the data was 
available; the hours for each engine are tracked and can be identified at each engine failure. 
For Coast Guard’s shipboard davits, however, hours of system operation are not recorded 
so that data is unavailable.  
Additionally, the diesel engines are interior systems that operate in the controlled 
environment of an engine room, so their failure rates could be expected to correlate 
primarily to engine wear. This makes the engine hours much more important to that failure 
analysis. On the other hand, davits are external systems that are constantly exposed to harsh 
environments regardless of whether they are operating. This includes extreme temperature 
ranges, precipitation, ice, sun radiation, and high salinity sea spray. Because of this, the 
expectation is that davit failure rates would not depend so much on operating hours as they 
would on time in service. Hence, time in service would be a desired time period for use in 
an assessment of davit failures. 
There are other related works that have applied Systems Engineering concepts to 
Coast Guard systems in various ways. Koski studied the impacts that the Coast Guard’s 
reliability-centered maintenance approach, relatively new at the time, had on the 
operational availability of the cutter fleet (2011). Koski implemented a “Soft Systems 
Methodology” for the analysis, which was more an investigative than a quantitative 
systems engineering approach to reliability analysis. Another related study by Marino used 
systems and business model approaches to examine Coast Guard cutter maintenance 
requirements and life cycle resource requirements (2018). Additionally, Pritchett used 
traditional system engineering and reliability-centered maintenance methodologies to 
explore how to better inform maintenance policies for current and future Coast Guard 
cutters (2018). In one form or another, each of these studies applied the concepts of 
reliability, availability, and life cycle maintenance to help manage Coast Guard assets. 
Finally, another valuable reference for approaching an analysis of davit failures is 
a Coast Guard maintenance analysis report that was performed on the Welin Lambie model 
5.0B davit in 2019. The author, Michael Holz, is a Senior Reliability Engineer at Coast 
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Guard’s SFLC Engineering Services Division. The report’s purpose was to analyze system 
failure data and parts supply-demand rates in order to “improve reliability and update 
planned maintenance” (Holz 2019, 1). It collected data across all cutter classes that use the 
model 5.0B davit including configuration data, supply data, maintenance completion data, 
and maintenance procedure cards for each class (Holz 2019). Recommendations were 
made for improvements throughout each aspect of the system management for which data 
was collected. The analysis focused primarily on the O-level maintenance conducted by 
the ship crews; however, it did not delve into the frequency at which D-level overhauls and 
renewals were taking place. This thesis attempts to address the D-level maintenance 





The research method for this thesis will primarily be statistical analysis based on 
archived empirical data and a case study of maintenance policies. The research will focus 
on the dual point davits onboard the WMEC-270 and WMEC-210 cutters as a case study 
to collect data on davit system failures. Data will also be gathered to determine when the 
major depot-level periodic maintenance work was done on these davits. The failure rates 
will be used to calculate the reliability and operational availability of the davit systems. 
The overall study will determine what effects the planned maintenance frequency has on 
the system’s reliability and availability. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
1. Scope 
The intent was to obtain a period of data that spans approximately eight to ten years. 
The thoroughness of the data becomes less reliable the older it is, and the data should all 
be relevant to SFLC’s current modernized organization. The Maintenance Analysis Report 
by Michael Holz was used as the primary source of failure data since that report had already 
harvested the FLS and EAL systems for davit failures via CASREPs and discrepancy 
reports (Holz 2019, 1). Based on the records available, the period of data used in this thesis 
is from January 1, 2011, to December 14, 2018, just shy of eight years. 
The maintenance completion records entered by cutter crews in FLS-MAM only 
date back to 2013, and there were very limited unscheduled maintenance entries made by 
crews (Holz 2019, 3). Despite this lack of information, however, the records and this 
author’s personal experience indicate that the cutters were more consistent in recording 
equipment failures that were not immediately correctable by the crew and impacted 
operations. These CASREP and discrepancy failures recorded in FLS and EAL are deemed 
the most important for an availability analysis. 
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2. Assumptions 
There are some assumptions that needed to be made before performing any analysis 
of the data. These assumptions were intended to simplify the analysis process and focus it 
on answering the research questions. However, the assumptions were also carefully chosen 
so they avoid causing changes to the results of any analysis. 
The davit casualty reports are considered reasonable accounts of historical failure 
events. This assumption can be made since the CASREP and discrepancy reports were 
following prescribed Coast Guard reporting policies that existed when they were created. 
This does not imply that all casualty records are complete or entirely accurate, but that they 
are official reports of actual events. 
Additionally, cutters and davits are considered homogenous populations. This 
means that the cutters used in the study are operated and maintained in accordance with 
the same official Coast Guard policies and procedures. This assumption lead to the 
selection of the usable data for the study. The davits themselves are homogenous in that 
they are all the same model and configuration of davit. The davits exist on different 
geographically dispersed ships that include two different cutter classes. However, the 
cutters are considered homogenous in that they are medium endurance cutters capable of 
performing similar Coast Guard missions in accordance with the same directives. Though 
this assumption of homogeneity guided the selection of data, the analysis will still test the 
data to ensure it can be statistically considered as part of the same population. 
3. Definitions 
The following definitions were established for consistency throughout the data 
collection, interpretation, and analysis. These definitions were influenced by Coast Guard 
or industry standards but were ultimately formulated by the author for the purposes of this 
study. 
Davit failure / inoperable – A condition that prevents the davit from being used to 
its designed operating capacity. This includes cases where standard operating procedures 
must be modified or by-passed in order to use the davit. For example, if a casualty results 
in a davit being unusable rough seas, this is deemed a davit failure for the purposes of this 
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study. The missions and purposes for which the davit is intended to operate in have been 
limited. 
Operable – A condition in which a davit system is fully operational and can be used 
for any mission as it was designed. An operable davit is fully functional while using the 
published standard operating procedures. 
Failure indicators – The linguistic entries in discrepancy reports that lead to the 
conclusion that a davit has failed. The existence of one or more failure indicators in a 
discrepancy report results in the davit being considered inoperable. Examples include 
discrepancy comments of “unable to use davit”; “unable to launch OTH”; “unable to launch 
in rough seas”; or an associated cutter readiness classification of “partial mission capable” 
or “not mission capable.” 
Non-system failures – Davit casualty reports that result from damage caused by 
other-than-normal use or events are not considered davit failures. For example, a davit 
damaged by shipyard crane operations during the vessel’s drydock is not considered a 
failure of the Welin Lambie davit system. 
Uptime – Any duration of time that a davit system is fully operational and available 
for use when required. This is not equivalent to hours of operation. 
Downtime – Any duration of time that a davit is in a failed or inoperable state, as 
previously defined.  
Time between failure – The duration of time between subsequent failures, starting 
with the date of a previous failure correction to the next date a failure is reported. 
Equivalent to the uptime between two failures. 
Discrepancy/failure duration – The duration of time that a davit is in a failed or 
inoperable state for a given failure event. Equivalent to the downtime for a single 
discrepancy report. 
 Given the wide variety of verbiage cutters have used in their davit casualty records, 
many decisions had to be made by the author on how to classify a discrepancy as operable 
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or inoperable. In cases where records were unclear, the definitions were applied as 
consistently as possible. 
For example, a common failure component was the davit accumulator bottles, for 
which crews gave impact assessments ranging from no impact to an inability to use the 
davit. Accumulator bottles hold reserve hydraulic pressure that allows the davit arms to 
temporarily luff outward or inward in the event of a power failure. As long as a cutter still 
has power to the davit, the davit is fully operational for all missions in accordance with 
standard operating procedures. For such discrepancy reports, the author’s decision for the 
davit being operable or inoperable was based on any available failure indicators as 
previously defined. 
Another example of applying the definitions to unclear records is when temporary 
repairs were indicated by the crew. In certain few cases the crew indicated that temporary 
repairs were made in order to keep the davit operational, but the discrepancy reports were 
not cleared until official repairs were made. For consistency, the davits were considered 
down and inoperable until their respective discrepancy reports were cleared. 
In rare cases, a davit casualty report was initiated by a cutter due to a component 
being removed and provided to correct another ship’s davit discrepancy. In these cases, the 
failures of both ship davits were included as inoperable reports, since the failure time of 
one davit transferred to the other davit as parts were swapped. 
4. Data Separation Process 
a. Failure Data 
The data records for the 2019 Holz Maintenance Analysis Report were reviewed 
and all failure and unscheduled maintenance reports were pulled from the records. As 
previously discussed, the unscheduled maintenance reports were few and incomplete for 
most cutters, so the CASREP and discrepancy reports were selected as the primary source 
of failure data. To avoid double-counting failures, CASREP reports from FLS were 
compared to discrepancy reports from EAL, and duplicates between the two systems were 
removed. 
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For each davit failure, the following important information was compiled: the 
failure title, a functional description of the failure component, the date the discrepancy was 
initially recorded, the date it was reported corrected, the operational or capability impacts, 
impacts on the cutter’s readiness, and the crews’ descriptive remarks. Table 1 provides an 
excerpt from one of the cutter’s davit discrepancy records. 

























* None given 
Discrep: 
2018019 Dual 
Point Davit  




MKIV OTH. SF 








REMARKS: SF tagged-out the dual 
point davit to replace one of the 
control joysticks. Upon clearing the 
tags and reenergizing the davit, 
none of the functions at the 
control station worked. Power is 
present at the control station and 
the PLC receives input data from 
the davit control joysticks but fails 











the Dual Point 
Davit due to 
damage to 
the aft boat 
block pin…  
* None 
given 
REMARKS: Upon inspection of the 
Welin Lambie Davit boat blocks in 
accordance with the Time Critical 
Maintenance Action TP2090.0 SF 
discovered the aft boat block 
tension pin to be bent but not 
sheared. SF ordered replacement 
pins and plan to install upon 
receipt… 
 
This information was collected for all 13 270-foot MECs and all 14 210-foot MECs. 
The author reviewed each report to determine which of the discrepancies resulted in the 
davit being inoperable, as previously defined. The failure indicators for this decision were 
primarily found in the readiness statements, operational or capability impacts, and 
additional remarks. Each record required a judgment call by the author based on the 
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assumptions and definitions that had been established. Then all reports having sufficient 
information to make a determination were assigned a designation of operable or 
inoperable. Some discrepancy reports lacked enough information to make a severity 
determination. For example, some reports contained no impact information or did not 
contain enough remarks for the author to infer a level of impact to davit capabilities. These 
records were assigned a designation of unknown.  
Next, all davit discrepancies categorized as operable or unknown were removed 
from the data pool, while those categorized as inoperable were retained for the failure 
analysis. This consolidated the records to include only the data samples that had an 
identifiable negative impact on davit equipment operations. All cutters but one, CGC 
STEADFAST, had usable collections of failure data. The STEADFAST reports were 
deemed unreliable as there were only three discrepancies recorded in the sources used for 
this thesis. Two of those three discrepancies did not have enough information to categorize 
the davit as inoperable or operable. As a result, no analysis could be made using the 
STEADFAST davit records and they were removed leaving a total of 26 MEC data sources. 
While compiling and categorizing the davit casualty records, some limitations were 
noted by the author. The duration that each discrepancy report is open, or the downtime of 
each failure, is not broken into periods of repair time, administrative time, logistics supply 
time, or other delays. Also, the failure records may not include davit casualties that were 
easily corrected by the crew in less than four hours, even if a davit was inoperable during 
that time (Holz 2019, 3). Some discrepancy reports appeared as canceled and incomplete 
when casualty repairs were rolled into planned maintenance availabilities. Additionally, 
the inconsistencies with report quality was a major concern; for example, CGC MOHAWK 
had three years of discrepancies (five reports) with no comments or amplifying remarks. 
Overall, the subjective nature of the report entries is deemed as a significant limitation 
since one Engineer Officer may consider a davit issue to be inoperable while another may 
feel comfortable operating it. The variations in how each cutter treats its equipment 
casualties depends heavily on the experience, technical knowledge, and level of risk 
acceptance that each cutter leadership has. 
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b. Scheduled Depot Maintenance Data 
The scheduled depot maintenance data was pulled directly from FLS archive 
records. Maintenance reports were obtained specifically for the Welin Lambie davits, then 
those were narrowed down to the planned overhauls and renewals. Any records that 
indicated they were a result of unplanned repair maintenance were removed. For example, 
many cutters had maintenance items tied to “CASREP FYXX” projects, which were funds 
that paid for unplanned depot-level discrepancy repairs. Additionally, any maintenance 
items that did not constitute overhauls or repairs to existing system components were 
removed, such as fleetwide upgrades to pad eye and bracket components. 
The resulting records for the two classes of cutters then had to be further cleaned 
up by removing glaring data entry anomalies. For example, each WMEC-270 had a davit 
renewal record—Welin Lambie Davit Renew, CMP41247 – entered with the same date of 
Oct 20, 2011. Based on the author’s experience, this was likely a mass entry made by the 
Product Line in order to establish or reestablish a class-wide baseline for the timeline of 
renewals. These October data points were removed from each cutter since they were an 
administrative artifact and not reflective of actual davit renewals. Similarly, six of the 
WMEC-210s had Aug 4, 2011 davit renewal entries with no associated project name or 
cost data, and these entries were removed. 
Furthermore, maintenance items that were obvious duplicates were removed. For 
example, several cutters had maintenance items that repeated only a few months apart 
within the same year, one showing no actual cost record followed by another showing an 
actual cost value. In these cases, the entries lacking associated costs or project connections 
were removed as duplicates. 
Like the failure records, the maintenance records had limitations that must be 
acknowledged. The decisions to remove duplicates and baseline entries reflected a larger 
concern over the reliability of the data to be taken on face value. The inconsistencies made 
it difficult to tell for sure if entries were accurate. For example, if a depot project was 
deferred to another time, but the entry was marked in FLS as complete instead of canceled, 
then it will show up as a completed overhaul or renewal even if no work took place. 
Additionally, the records obtained by the author did not provide the start and end dates of 
24 
each davit planned maintenance event. Therefore, the downtime for planned maintenance 
is not included in future calculations, and each davit overhaul or renewal completion is 
treated as a point in time. 
c. Combining Failure and Maintenance Data 
Once the failure and planned maintenance data were collected and scrubbed for 
each cutter, the next step was to combine the information for each davit system. Combining 
the data resulted in breaking the full period of interest, January 1, 2011, to December 14, 
2018, into a series of smaller periods of maintenance and failure events. This made it 
possible to calculate the amount of davit uptime and downtime for each cutter, as well as 
the number of failures that occurred between planned maintenance actions. Table 2 
provides an example of the resulting combined information. 
Table 2. Consolidated Failure and Planned Depot Maintenance Data 
for CGC ACTIVE. 







Days From To Start End Uptime Down time 
Data start Overhaul 01-Jan-11 01-Oct-11 273  273 0 273 
Overhaul Failure 
start 







1       
Failure 
correction 
Renewal 24-Aug-15 12-Oct-15 49 
 
      
Renewal Failure 
start 
12-Oct-15 24-Oct-17 743 
 












27-Oct-17 25-Apr-18 180 
 












29-Apr-18 29-Oct-18 184 
 







30       
Failure 
correction 
Data end 28-Nov-18 14-Dec-18 15 
 
      
25 
The information illustrated in Table 2 was then used to further consolidate the data 
into periods between maintenance actions and separate davit systems from one another. In 
order to gain an understanding of the availability of each davit, the data taken from each 
cutter had to be reorganized. When a davit is overhauled, it may be considered to have a 
refresh on its life cycle, but it is still the same unit. However, when a davit is renewed, that 
cutter receives a different davit with a different serial number. Therefore, a cutter that has 
a recorded davit renewal will have at least two davit units each with its own set of failure 
data. This data needed to be separated accordingly. 
The result was a list of 45 davits that each were divided up by periods between 
scheduled depot maintenance actions. This permitted the uptime, downtime, number of 
failures, and time between maintenance actions to be determined for each davit. If a davit 
was renewed, then each davit was indicated as “CUTTER NAME-1”; “CUTTER NAME-
2” and so on. Table 3 provides an excerpt from the full table of davits. 
Table 3. Consolidated Failure and Maintenance Data per Davit Unit. 













01-Jan-11 01-Oct-11 273 0 273 0 1 
After 
Overhaul 
01-Oct-11 12-Oct-15 1471 1 1472 1 1 
ACTIVE-2 After Renewal 




01-Jan-11 15-Feb-13 776 0 776 0 1 
After 
Overhaul 
15-Feb-13 13-Aug-17 1546 94 1640 5 1 
ALERT-2 After Renewal 
13-Aug-17 14-Dec-18 256 232 488 1 0 
CONFIDENCE-1 Before Renewal 




25-Jan-14 29-Jul-18 1646 0 1646 0 1 
After 
Overhaul 
29-Jul-18 14-Dec-18 138 0 138 0 0 
DAUNTLESS-1 Before Renewal 
01-Jan-11 12-Jan-15 1336 136 1472 6 1 
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12-Jan-15 14-Dec-18 1309 123 1432 3 0 
 
As shown in Table 3, the overall data available for each cutter begins with January 
1, 2011, and ends with December 14, 2018. These dates generated left-censored data for 
each cutter’s first davit and right-censored data for each cutter’s last davit. The censoring 
included the unknown previous or future failures and maintenance actions. The second to 
last column includes the number of known failures that occurred within each period 
recorded, and the last column shows the number of known maintenance actions that 
occurred in that period. For consistency, if a period ended in an overhaul or renewal, that 
period was marked as having one known maintenance action. If a period ended with the 
termination of data collection, then the maintenance is right-censored and there were zero 
known maintenance actions assigned to that period. 
The compiled data for all davits will be used in the analysis to calculate the failure 
rate that occurred between each subsequent maintenance action, the MTBF within each 
period, and the MTBM within each period. From there, a more in-depth statistical analysis 
can be performed. 
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to answer the research questions, the data must be analyzed for usable 
information. The goal in analyzing any of the data shall be to address the research 
questions. The first question is determining how the failure and maintenance data that the 
Coast Guard currently collects can be used to generate system failure models. In order to 
begin answering that question, there needs to be some observations or conclusions that can 
be made regarding the data. Those observations can then be used to build a model to modify 
and study, which helps answer the second research question. 
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1. Analysis Techniques 
The analysis techniques chosen will depend on the type and quality of the data 
available, and how that data can be manipulated to lend useful observations. The primary 
dependent variable of concern is the operational availability of the davit system, and how 
that is influenced by scheduled depot maintenance periodicity. It will also be prudent to 
explore other independent variables besides the maintenance periodicity to fully round out 
the understanding of the relationships among variables. 
a. Exploring Data Relationships 
The primary method of exploring the data is to statistically identify relationships, 
if any, that exist among the independent and dependent variables. A qualitative way to 
determine relationships is to plot the data and visually look for patterns. The initial 
approach will be to perform basic plots of each variable of interest such as failure rate and 
mean time between failures against the mean time between maintenance. This allows for a 
rudimentary identification of any trends that appear between the variables. While this is 
helpful to target the most obvious relationships, there would need to be a quantitative 
statistical analysis to identify the more obscure relationships. 
b. Paired t-tests 
A quantitative analysis can be performed in several ways and choosing a method 
can be determined by the variety of factors that may exist in the data. One simple method 
is to perform a t-test, which will help determine if two sets of samples are statistically 
different. A null and alternative hypothesis are each made as to whether the population 
means are equal or unequal. Then the t-test looks at the mean and variance of each set of 
sample data and makes it possible to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
Regarding the davit information, a t-test can accomplish several important 
comparisons. First, a t-test will be needed to ensure the failure data collected from the two 
pools of samples – 210-foot MEC davits and 270-foot MEC davits – can be treated as being 
from the same population. Another test can be used to determine if censored data has a 
significant effect on the overall samples. If a test cannot reject a null hypothesis that the 
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mean of the censored data is the same as the mean of the uncensored data, then the data 
from both sets can be treated equally. A t-test can also be used to determine whether the 
type of planned depot maintenance, overhaul or renewal, has a statistically discernable 
effect on failure rate. 
c. Single-factor ANOVA 
Another way to assess a set of data is to perform an analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
which makes it possible to compare the means of three or more groups of data 
(Montgomery and Runger 2014, 539). If there are multiple groups, or levels, of one factor 
then a single-factor ANOVA can be performed to identify the variability between groups 
and within the groups. Like the t-test, a null and alternative hypothesis will be made as to 
whether the population means are equal or unequal. An F-test is performed which 
compares the mean square for the treatments (MST), or variance between groups, to the 
mean square for error (MSE), the variance within the groups. This ratio generates an F 





=  (1.6) 
As shown by Montgomery and Runger, F0 has an F-distribution with a critical 
value of , 1, ( 1)a a nfα − − . If the calculated F0 is greater than the critical F value, then it indicates 
there is greater variance between the groups than there is within the groups, thereby 
rejecting a null hypothesis that the group means are all the same (Montgomery and Runger 
2014, 545). 
There are several ways that the data for davit failures can be broken down into bins 
for one factor. These can be used to identify levels of influence that the factor has on the 
failure rates and ultimately the operational availability. For example, the mean time 
between scheduled maintenance can be separated into multiple groups of equal sizes such 
as 0–500 days, 500–1000 days, 1000–1500 days, and 1500–2000 days. The single factor is 
the MTBM values, but there are four levels chosen for that factor. Another factor that can 
be considered is the location or region in which each davit is primarily located. Since each 
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cutter can patrol in a broad array of climates, the most dependable treatment for a location 
would be the homeport where the cutters spend up to half each year.  
d. Two-factor ANOVA 
If the single-factor ANOVA identify relationships, then performing two-factor 
ANOVA tests may be useful for identifying more discrete relationships among the davit 
failure data. Like the one-way ANOVA, the two-way ANOVA compares the variance 
within and among groups of a factor. However, the two-way process also allows for the 
identification of interactions between variables (Montgomery and Runger 2014, 581). By 
using this method, the F statistics, the resulting P-values for each factor, and their 
combinations can be used to identify the level of influence that exists. A small P-value 
would indicate a greater significance to the level of influence. 
This can be a useful tool to identify variables, or combinations of variables, that 
influence the davit failure rates. Specifically, the two-factor ANOVA can be used to 
identify interactions that exist between combinations such as davit geographic location and 
maintenance type, or between MTBMS groups and location. 
D. DEVELOPING A MODEL 
The research questions ask whether the data that is currently collected by the Coast 
Guard can be used to develop a failure model. Depending on the outcome of the statistical 
analysis, a model may be developed to experiment with potential impacts on operational 
availability. One method for doing this is to use ExtendSim, which is a modeling and 
simulation software that has a broad range of uses including engineering, scheduling, and 
analysis (ExtendSim n.d.). It implements simple icons and lines that the user can 
manipulate to provide layers of intricacy to a model. It generates a visual representation 
similar to a flow-block diagram but consists of many imbedded menus that allow for 
detailed modification of parameters and information. Once a model is created, it can be run 
in a time-based simulation that allows the user to collect and analyze resulting data. 
For the purposes of the davit failure data, ExtendSim could potentially be used to 
simulate davits entering a life cycle which applies maintenance actions at an average 
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periodicity determined by the analysis of the data. They will then experience failures and 
repairs at rates and distributions that are supported by the archived data. The output of the 
simulation provides calculated expectations of the operational availability of the davit 
systems. The benefit of this modeling and simulation is the ability to run the scenario 






The intended analysis methodology was applied to the data with some necessary 
modifications. Much of the analysis evolution was dependent on the quality of the data and 
the results that were discovered in each previous step of the analysis. The results were less 
definitive than expected, which may be an indicator as to the quality of the data. 
Nonetheless, the outcomes still provided useful information for davit maintenance 
management. 
B. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
1. Pooling the Samples 
The first step of the analysis after compiling all the data was to verify whether the 
two sources of data were statistically from the same population. Failure and maintenance 
records were collected from two separate groups of samples: davits on WMEC-210s and 
davits on WMEC-270s. This report’s analysis intended to treat these sets of data as being 
from the same overall population, that being the Welin Lambie twin pivot arm davit model 
TW.PIV 5.0B. Therefore, a hypothesis test was performed in order to determine whether 
these two data sets could be pooled. The factors that were evaluated for each set of data 
was the number of inoperable davit failures and the MTBF that resulted for each class of 
cutter. Table 4 and Table 5 present summaries of these values for both cutter classes. 
Table 4. WMEC-210 MTBF Summary 
Cutter Location No. of Failures MTBF (days) 
ACTIVE Port Angeles, WA 4 385.3 
ALERT Astoria, OR 7 161.9 
CONFIDENCE Port Canaveral, FL 5 148.8 
DAUNTLESS Pensacola, FL 10 250.4 
DECISIVE Pensacola, FL 19 116.4 
DEPENDABLE Little Creek, VA 9 199.6 
DILIGENCE Wilmington, NC 10 234.8 
RELIANCE Kittery, ME 4 57.7 
RESOLUTE St Petersburg, FL 16 138.8 
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Cutter Location No. of Failures MTBF (days) 
VALIANT Mayport, FL 7 375.3 
VENTUROUS St Petersburg, FL 8 315.6 
VIGILANT Port Canaveral, FL 3 932.3 
VIGOROUS Little Creek, VA 9 293.1 
Table 5. WMEC-270 MTBF Summary 
Cutter Location No. of Failures MTBF (days) 
BEAR Portsmouth, VA 7 226.8 
CAMPBELL Kittery, ME 9 317.6 
ESCANABA Boston, MA 8 27.1 
FORWARD Portsmouth, VA 9 301.1 
HARRIET LANE Portsmouth, VA 6 283.4 
LEGARE Portsmouth, VA 16 111.5 
MOHAWK Key West, FL 8 294.1 
NORTHLAND Portsmouth, VA 7 435.1 
SENECA Boston, MA 9 295.6 
SPENCER Boston, MA 6 219.6 
TAHOMA Kittery, ME 7 412.6 
TAMPA Portsmouth, VA 14 201.4 
THETIS Key West, FL 10 206.5 
 
Since each sample set had less than 30 data points, a two-sample t-test was used as 
the statistical testing method. From the data available, the following hypothesis was made: 
Null hypothesis  1 2:oH µ µ=  
Alternative hypothesis 1 2:aH µ µ≠  
Where 1µ  and 2µ  represent the means for the WMEC-210 and WMEC-270 data sets, 
respectively. Because these davits are all the same model, their population variances were 
assumed to be the same but are unknown, which required the use of a pooled variance. 
Testing the means was a two-sided assessment so the critical limit tα,n1+n2-2 with a 
95% confidence level was calculated to be 2.06. The null hypothesis would be rejected if 
the test statistic T was greater than the critical limit. Therefore: 
Reject Ho if |T | > 2.06 
33 
Based on the MTBF as the parameter of interest, the test statistic was calculated to 
be |T | = 0.312. Subsequently with the number of failures as the parameter of interest, the 
test statistic was |T | = 0.251. Since both were less than the critical t, both tests failed to 
reject the null hypothesis indicating that neither the MTBF nor the number of failures are 
significantly different. Therefore, the data collected from the WMEC-210 and WMEC-270 
cutters were pooled together for use in the remaining analyses. 
2. Calculating MTBF and MTBM 
Determining that both data sources could be treated equally increased the sample 
size for our analyses. The initial calculations were performed to determine failure rate, 
MTBF, and MTBM for each individual davit. These calculations were based on the 
summarized data that was presented in Table 3. First, the failure rate λ between planned 
maintenance actions was calculated using Equation 1.2, the number of days between 
maintenance, and the number of failures that occurred in that period. For example, the 










λ = = =  
Since MTBF is just the reciprocal of the failure rate, that was also calculated for 
each davit using Equation 1.3. For periods where no failures occurred, the failure rate was 
zero resulting in MTBF being incalculable. 
Due to each davit having so few scheduled maintenance actions, the period between 
each planned depot maintenance was treated as the MTBMS. This was applied to Equation 
1.4 along with the calculated MTBF, or MTBMU, to determine the overall MTBM for each 
period between a davit’s planned maintenance. For example, the first maintenance period 
for davit ALERT-1 had MTBM values equal to the period duration of 273 days since there 
were no failures in that time. However, the next maintenance period for ALERT-1 had a 













Additionally, the davit availability between scheduled maintenance actions was 
calculated using a variation of Equation 1.5. Since the actual days up and days down were 






For example, ACTIVE-1 had an availability of 1.0 and 0.999 between subsequent 
maintenance periods, and ACTIVE-2 has an availability of 0.968. These values provided 
more ways to observe the data. 
3. Treatment of Censored Data 
One of the intended methods for exploring data relationships was through plotting, 
followed by paired t-tests if needed. The correlation between censored and uncensored data 
was one such relationship that needed to be examined before moving further in the analysis. 
As discussed with Table 3, there are many periods in the data that included left or right 
censoring. 
To get an initial sense of whether censoring had any impact on the data, several 
plots were made using all the data and then for comparison using only uncensored data. 
These are shown side-by-side in  Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
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Figure 5. MTBMS versus Failure Rate Using All Data (left) and Only 
Uncensored Data (right). 
 
Figure 6. MTBMS versus Number of Failures Using All Data (left) and Only 
Uncensored Data (right). 
As seen in these plot comparisons, there visually appears to be a concentration of 
uncensored maintenance periods between 1000 to 2000 days, whereas the censored 
maintenance periods have a greater spread. Since the censored maintenance periods consist 
of truncated timeframes, it made sense that there could be a higher frequency of censored 
periods with shorter durations. However, this visual representation only provided an 
indicator that there could be a significant difference between the data types.  
To statistically compare the uncensored data to the censored data, another two-
sample t-test was performed. The following hypothesis was made: 






























































Alternative hypothesis 1 2:aH µ µ≠  
Where 1µ  and 2µ  represent the means for censored scheduled maintenance periods and 
uncensored scheduled maintenance periods, respectively. Following the null hypothesis, 
their population variances were assumed to be the same for the test. 
Testing the means was a two-sided assessment so the critical limit tα,n1+n2-2 with a 
95% confidence level was calculated to be 1.99. The null hypothesis would be rejected if 
the test statistic T was greater than the critical limit. Therefore: 
Reject Ho if |T | > 1.99 
Based on the time between scheduled maintenance, the test statistic was calculated to be 
|T| = 2.05. Since this was greater than the critical t, the test rejected the null hypothesis, 
which indicated that the means were significantly different. Therefore, the censored data 
could not be treated the same as the uncensored data. Because of this significant difference 
and the fact that censored maintenance periods lacked complete records of failure and 
maintenance intervals, the censored data was removed from further analysis in favor of 
only using the uncensored data. 
4. Exploring Relationships within Uncensored Data 
The next step was to start looking for trends in the remaining data. The simplest 
methodology was employed first, which was to again plot the information and visually 




Figure 7. Combined MTBM versus MTBF 
The calculated MTBM showed a linear trend when compared with the MTBF. 
While this looked like a clear trend initially, it was simply an artifact of the way MTBM 
was calculated within this analysis. The MTBM was calculated between scheduled 
maintenance actions, so MTBF drove the overall MTBM calculations with little impact 
resulting from MTBMS. 
 
Figure 8. MTBMS versus MTBF 
The scheduled maintenance actions showed little noticeable trending when 




































to be a possible trend upward; however, that pattern is less apparent for the rest of the data 
points. 
 
Figure 9. MTBMS versus Availability 
The presentation of MTBMS compared with davit availability also showed little to 
no patterns in the data. All plots served as initial assessments of the data in order to begin 
identifying the most obvious effects between factors. While none of them showed any 
conclusive trends that were actionable, they did not disprove the existence of relationships. 
Further statistical analysis was used to better explore the information. 
5. Impact of Maintenance Action Type on Failure Rate 
One important factor to examine was the effect that the type of maintenance action 
had on the failure rates. This was determined using another paired t-test that compared the 
MTBF for davits that had most recently been overhauled to those that had most recently 
been renewed. The null hypothesis was made that their mean MTBF values were equal, 
with the alternative being that they were unequal. Assuming equal variances, the test 
statistic was 0.057 while the critical t was 2.12. Because the statistic existed within the 
critical limits, the test failed to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, there was no statistical 


















6. Single-Factor ANOVA Tests 
Some additional statistical tests compared several groups of data, and therefore 
required the use of single-factor ANOVA tests. The first was intended to assess the impact 
that MTBMS duration had on MTBF. The scheduled maintenance durations were broken 
into four groups: 0–500 days, 500–1000 days, 1000–1500 days, and 1500–2000 days. 
Figure 10 shows the summary of the ANOVA results. 
 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance     
0-500 2 230.5 115.25 3240.125     
500-1000 2 631.7 315.8333333 60.5     
1000-1500 9 6010 667.787037 324398.86     
1500-2000 5 1703 340.62 8299.422     
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 734263.976 3 244754.6587 1.3020403 0.312786 3.34389 
Within Groups 2631689.16 14 187977.7973       
Total 3365953.14 17         
Figure 10. Summary of ANOVA for MTBMS Groups 
Despite a wide difference in the averages amongst the groups, the variances also 
widely varied. The F0 statistic is less than Fcrit, therefore the variance within the groups 
was not significantly less than the variance between the groups. This ANOVA failed to 
statistically show any significant difference in MTBF that resulted from the duration of the 
MTBMS. 
Another factor explored was the geographic location of each davit. This was based 
on the location that each cutter is homeported. The locations were grouped into four general 
regions: North-East, Mid-Atlantic, South-East, and Pacific-Northwest. There were two 
factors that were individually explored with regard to location, the MTBMS and the MTBF. 
The MTBMS was important to first determine whether the maintenance was being 
conducted the same regardless of the cutter locations. The MTBF was subsequently 
important to see whether there was a difference in failure rates given specific locations. 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 present the summaries of the two ANOVA results.  
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Groups Count Sum Average Variance     
NorthEast 2 2958 1479 12482     
MidAtlantic 7 9232 1318.857143 238337.14     
SouthEast 7 7427 1061 231957.33     
Pacific NW 2 3112 1556 14112     
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 572476.754 3 190825.5847 0.9379283 0.448527 3.34389 
Within Groups 2848360.86 14 203454.3469       
Total 3420837.61 17         
Figure 11. Summary of ANOVA for MTBMS by Region 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance     
NorthEast 2 669.5 334.75 5995.125     
MidAtlantic 7 3448 492.6333333 193625.66     
SouthEast 7 2657 379.6309524 179573.05     
Pacific NW 2 1800 900 654368     
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 466397.752 3 155465.9172 0.7506402 0.539937 3.34389 
Within Groups 2899555.39 14 207111.099       
Total 3365953.14 17         
Figure 12. Summary of ANOVA for MTBF by Region 
In both cases, the F0 statistic existed within the critical limits. Therefore, the 
geographic region in which the davits were homeported did not have a significant effect on 
the periodicity of their scheduled depot maintenance nor on their MTBF. 
The next level of analysis would normally have included two-factor ANOVAs to 
determine interactions between the variables. However, due to the lack of statistical 
influence that was detected in the single-factor ANOVAs, we expected little benefit that 
would result from conducting two-factor analyses. To confirm this, one example two-factor 




Figure 13. Two-Factor Test Results, Effect Summary (top) and ANOVA 
(bottom). 
The individual p-values shown in the Effect Summary indicated that neither the 
individual variables nor their interaction have a statistically significant impact on the 
MTBF. Additionally, the ANOVA p-value of 0.58 indicated that the combined effects of 
each variable do not have a statistically significant impact on the MTBF.  
C. THEORETICAL MODELING AND SIMULATION 
1. Model Design 
The results of the statistical analysis provided little structure to build a model and 
simulation the way it was initially intended. The lack of interactions between independent 
and dependent variables yielded few functions that were needed for a traditional 
experimentation with the archival data. Despite these limitations, a model was designed in 
ExtendSim that illustrated how one could theoretically conduct simulations if better data 
or interactions were available. 
The model was a discrete-event simulation designed to follow the life cycle of a 
series of davits through their failures and maintenance actions. The inputs were MTBF, 
MDT, renewal periodicity, and overhaul periodicity, while the outputs were the number of 
failures, total uptime, total downtime, and calculated operational availability. Once davits 
are created, they flow through a decision block that sends them through a renewal or 
overhaul path of data inputs. A normally distributed random MTBF value is then applied 
to each davit, which results in a measured uptime, then a normally distributed random MDT 
is applied, which results in a measured downtime. 
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Each davit’s age is continuously measured throughout the flow, which informs a 
decision block on what maintenance actions will be performed on each unit. When its age 
exceeds the renewal periodicity, it reenters the life cycle through the renewal inputs and its 
age is reset to zero. If a davit’s age exceeds the overhaul periodicity but not the renewal 
periodicity, it reenters the life cycle through the overhaul inputs and retains its age. If a 
davit’s age exceeds neither planned maintenance periodicity, it reenters as a repair unit and 
continues through the flow until it meets either depot maintenance criteria. An image of 
the full model is provided in the Appendix. 
2. Experimentation 
To demonstrate the potential utility of the model, an experiment was performed to 
examine the theoretical impacts of maintenance periodicity. For the model to provide 
actionable output information, the number of variables had to be reduced. We decided to 
look at the relationship that MTBF and renewal periodicity had with davit availability if 
the overhaul periodicity was kept constant. This simulated a situation in which the overhaul 
schedule was firmly accepted and had little variability, but maintenance managers wanted 
to determine whether the renewal periodicity could be adjusted and still achieve an 
expected level of availability. 
Following the modeling approach presented in (MacCalman, Beery, and Paulo 
2016), an experimental design strategy for the simulation was defined, resulting in 33 
combinations of input variables that were replicated 30 times for a total of 990 model runs. 
The overhaul periodicity was kept constant at 1460 days to represent the current four-year 
policy, and the MTBF was held constant at 472 days, which reflected the average seen in 
the uncensored data. For the overhaul inputs, a nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube was 
developed based on (Sanchez 2011), which generated the 33 MTBF and periodicity 
combinations. The MTBF values ranged between 180 days to 730 days, while the overhauls 
spanned 1460 to 2920 days. For both the overhaul and renewal database inputs, the MDT 
was held constant at 28 days, which reflected the average downtime seen in past records. 
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3. Simulation Results and Analysis 
A statistical analysis was performed using the results from the model to assess 
possible interactions among MTBF, renewal periodicity, and availability. The availability 
was assigned as the dependent variable with MTBF and renewal periodicity assigned as 
the independent variables. A fit of least squares was applied to the resulting model which 
had a R2 value of 0.98. Figure 14 illustrates the closeness of the fit. 
 
Figure 14. Data Fit Comparing Actual to Predicted Availability 
Next, we evaluated the effects that the independent variables had on the dependent 
variable. The MTBF and renewal periodicity (RenewTime) were evaluated linearly and 
quadratically, as well as their combined influence. All but the quadratic RenewTime 
showed significant effects as indicated by their p-values as shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Effects Summary 
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The effects summary also indicated that MTBF had a greater effect on availability 
than the RenewTime. A prediction profiler provided an additional visualization of this 
result as shown in Figure 16. The relative steepness of the curves shows that the changes 
in MTBF resulted in more drastic change to availability than changes in RenewTime. 
 
Figure 16. Availability Prediction Profiler for MTBF and RenewTime 
One way to make these results actionable was to observe the interactions through 
contour profilers, as described in (Whitcomb and Beery 2016), which made it possible to 
adjust the factors and response parameters to desired values. For example, if a specific 
availability lower limit was required by policy, this tool would make it possible to quickly 
determine what MTBF would need to be maintained when renewals are happening at a 
given periodicity. Three contour profile examples are shown in Figure 17 with 
progressively higher availability limits. 
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Figure 17. Contour Profiler Showing Requirements to Achieve Three Levels 
of Availability 
The results of this theoretical model exploration show that for the given parameters, 
the planned davit renewal strategy does not impact the overall availability as much as 
maintaining a specific level of MTBF. Theoretically, the renewal periodicity could be 
extended years beyond the current policy without significantly reducing the availability of 
the davit. However, if the crew, product line, and environmental factors are unable to 
maintain a minimum level of MTBF, then the availability will slip. 
  
Availability Lower Limit 
93.5% 
Availability Lower Limit 
92% 
Availability Lower Limit 
95% 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Analyzing archived data for the purposes of informing maintenance policies can be 
an effective tool, but its fidelity is dependent on the quality of the records being kept. This 
study used system failure reports to determine the influence that planned depot 
maintenance periodicity has on davit failure rates and operational availability. The results 
were informative even though they did not present the level of significant relationships 
expected. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The statistical analysis resulted in a consistent lack of significant influence that 
independent variables had on the dependent variables. The absence of trends in the davit 
failure records seem to indicate a random failure rate and no sign of system wear-out over 
time. This may indicate that the failure rate as it relates to system age should not be a major 
consideration for the periodicity of planned depot maintenance. Other considerations such 
as corrosion and an increased rate of organizational maintenance or repairs needed to 
maintain operations will likely be greater driving factors. However, from a depot 
maintenance standpoint, there could be room to increase the duration between costly 
planned depot maintenance without resulting in a higher rate of failures due to a davit’s 
inherent age. 
The results of the analyses provided answers to the research questions, even if the 
outcomes were not as expected. The first question asked how system failure and 
maintenance data that the Coast Guard currently collects could be used to generate system 
failure models. A theoretical model was ultimately developed to explore this to some 
degree, but the crux of this research question is essentially asking how usable the data is 
that is currently being collected. The Coast Guard cutter discrepancy records contained 
inconsistent verbiage, missing information, and unclear impact statements which made it 
difficult to define and categorize the data points. This has great potential to influence the 
outcome of the analysis if the records are treated differently than they were in this study.  
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The second research question asked how the frequency of depot-level maintenance 
can be modified to improve the operational availability of the MEC davits. Initially, the 
author expected to see some trends that could be applied to a model for experimentation. 
The statistical analysis however revealed that the davit availability and failure rates did not 
have a significant dependency on the planned depot maintenance timing. While not the 
expected result, it is usable in that maintenance planners may have more flexibility in 
scheduling overhauls and renewals. Other factors aside from system reliability are likely 
more significant driving factors such as depot maintenance costs, operational schedules, 
and changes in crew maintenance required to keep the systems operational.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The type of analysis presented in this thesis can be used for future maintenance 
planning once a historic record base is established. However, for the Coast Guard to gain 
from this methodology, the maintenance policies must continue to enforce discrepancy 
reporting requirements and improve standardization of the type of information they 
contain. During the data gathering, it was clear that the recent EAL discrepancy reports 
were far more thorough and consistent than older FLS CASREPs. This reflected the Coast 
Guard’s efforts over the past years to modernize the reporting systems. The reports 
effectively serve their purpose of reporting issues, reporting operational status, and 
requesting logistics aid from the product lines. However, improvements would be needed 
to effectively be used for maintenance planning via statistical analysis. 
The davit system failures and maintenance cannot be analyzed using the same 
techniques that have been applied to equipment like the diesel engines and generators. If 
davit operating hours were tracked and logged the way engine hours are, then those 
techniques could be applied. Without that information however, the methodology used in 
this report would theoretically be possible given consistent and accurate archived records. 
Being exterior systems, davit maintenance would expectedly be influenced more by 
environmental factors than interior engines are, so the operating hours may be less 
significant than system age. 
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C. FUTURE WORK 
It could be beneficial to experiment more with the way assumptions and definitions 
were applied to the original data to see how that influences the analysis results. For 
example, what would happen if the discrepancy reports were interpreted differently and 
therefore classified differently? Would the number and frequency of inoperable davits 
change? Also, when discrepancy reports lacked enough information to be classified, what 
would happen if they were treated as inoperable data instead of operable data? These 
questions could lead to a sensitivity analysis that provides even more insight into the 
information needed in failure reports. 
There is also benefit to further experimentation with the model developed for this 
study. Chapter IV presented one example of testing the possible effects between 
maintenance periodicity, MTBF, and availability; however, there are many more “what if” 
scenarios that can be explored. The model could also be adapted to experiment with failure 
and maintenance rates on other Coast Guard cutter systems such as fire pumps, buoy 
handling cranes, and anchor winches. 
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